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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by ancl through , 
its ROAD COM!;IlSSION, 
Pfointiff-Reupondent, y 
( 
vs. 
.JACK C. JENSEN and 1'\1El1EA \V. l 
JENSEN, his wife, and INTER- \ 
}\JOTTNTAIN HOLDING cord- ,. 
PANY 
' Defen(fonfg-Appellants. 
\Case No. 
11387 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of a condemnation suit 
brought by the State of Utah, by and through its Road 
Commission, to condemn a right of way belonging to 
defendants located in the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, for interstate highway purposes. 
1 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 
LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from an order granting respou<l-
ent a new trial following the first trial in this matter, 
and from a judgment rendered for appellants and 
against respondent in the second trial of the above 
matter. 
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the trial court's order 
granting to respondent a new trial, and request that 
the verdict entered by the jury in the first trial be 
reinstated; or in the alternative, that the jury's verdict 
in the first trial be reduced to the amount determined 
by the first trial court in its remittiture order ma<lc 
and entered in the above matter; or further, in the 
alternative, granting to appellants a new trial based 
upon the second trial court's error in accepting a verdict 
from a jury which had improperly deliberated. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah, by and through its Road Com· 
mission, commenced an action to condemn a 20 foot 
right-of-way opening to the defendant-appellants' prop· 
erty, which right-of-way was located on the northeast 
side of Parleys Canyon near its mouth, in Salt Lake 
2 
County, Utah. The property owned by the defendants 
to which the right-of-way was appurtenant is com-
monly known as the Century Placer, a tract of land 
originally located and patented under the mining laws 
of the United States relating to placer claims, the 
original tract of land consisting of 80 acres. 
In 1955 the State of Utah negotiated with de-
fendants' predecessor in interest, the American Smelt-
ing & Refining Co., and as a result of the negotiations 
a written contract was entered into between the parties 
whereby the American Smelting & Refining Co. ga\'e 
up all of its right of access of Highway U. S. 40, which 
adjoined the property in question on the south, and in 
consideration the State granted to American Smelting 
& Refining Co. a 20 foot right-of-way to Highway 
U.S. 40 and agreed to construct an approach to this 
20 foot access opening. The location of this right-of-
way was designated on the ground by a particular engi-
neer's stake description. The State of Utah paid to 
American Smelting & Refining Co. a sum of money 
for approximately 7 acres of land transferred from the 
Century Placer to it for expansion purposes of High-
way U.S. 40, and for the giving up of the right of 
ingress and egress to Highway U.S; 40 except through 
the 20 foot right-of-way opening, the only existing 
access to the entire tract of land. (R-37) 
In 1961 the defendants Jack C. Jens en and Merea 
W. Jensen acquired the property from a successor in 
interest to American Smelting & Refining Co., con-
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sis ting of 73.2 acres. The defendants Jensen subse-
quently conveyed one-half interest in the property tu 
the defendant Intermountain Holding Company, whicli 
is a partnership consisting of Mr. Raymond C. Bowen, 
his wife and children. (R-150) in 1961 (R-164). ln 
1962 .Mr. Jensen requested the State of Utah to con., 
struct the approach road to the 20 foot access opening, 
which the State of Utah declined to do on the grounds 
that: ( 1) the cost of the construction would be too 
expensive in that the access opening was not where the 
parties had thought it was, and it was impracticable 
1 
to construct the access opening at that point; and (2) 
the State of Utah did not wish to enhance the value 
of the defendants' property in that it would be neces· . 
sary to condemn the access opening when Interstate i 
80 came down Parleys Canyon several years hence. 
(R-33, 34) 
On May 18, 1964, the State of Utah commenced 
the above action ( R-5) and sought an order of imme-
diate occupancy, the order of immediate occupancy 
being granted to the plaintiff on the 25th day of May, 
1964. (R-152) 
Subsequently the defendants commenced an inde· 
pendent action against the State of Utah for breach 
of contract for its failure to construct the approach 
road to the 20 foot right-of-way access, and this matter 
was settled by stipulation of the parties, whereby the 
State of Utah paid to the defendants the approximate 
sum of $8,000.00. (R-51) 
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On the 13th day of September, 1967, the condem-
nation suit was tried to a court sitting with jury, the 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. Following 
fiYe days of trial, during which time the jury had an 
opportunity to visit the subject land, the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the defendants in the sum of 
$Hi,251.00 (R-94) and judgment on the verdict was 
entered on September 29, 1967 (R-115). The evidence 
adduced at the trial in the above matter showed that 
the subject property was landlocked by reason of the 
State's taking of the 20 foot access opening ( R-51) 
there being no other legal right-of-way to defendants' 
property. The evidence adduced at the trial showed 
the damages to defendants' property by reason of the 
taking of the sole access to the property at between 
$58,400.00 as the highest figure (R-170), $25,300.00 
as the lowest damage figure of defendants' witnesses 
( R-328), and $0.0 as the lowest figure ( R-428, 449) 
of any witness.Needless to say the $0.0 figure was testi-
fied to by the plaintiff's experts, and the other figures 
testified to by defendants' experts. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court upon 
motion filed by plaintiff's counsel entered a conditional 
order of remittiture specifying that if defendants would 
accept the sum of $12,001.00 in lieu of the $16,251.00 
found by the jury, the court would not enter an order 
of new trial, the court basing its order upon excessive 
rlamages and bias and prejudice as alleged by plain-
tiff's counsel. (R-124, 125; R-130) 
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The defendants accepted the remittiture and agreer! 
to take the $12,001.00 provided that the plaintiff would 
not appeal the case. (R-142) The defendants based 
their qualified acceptance of the remittiture on the basis 
that they did not want to be in a position of accepting 
a remittiture to $12,001.00 and then have the State 
appeal the case, and if the jury verdict was sustained 
then claim that the defendants would only be entitled 
to the amount of the remittiture, thereby having nothing 
to lose on appeal and everything to gain. 
In spite of the defendants' willingness to accept • 
the remittiture, the court entered an order granting a 
new trial to the plaintiff. (R-130) 
The defendants filed a petition for intermediate 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah in this matter, 
but the court declined to accept the appeal (Case No. 
11123, Supreme Court of Utah). 
Upon second trial of this matter, a jury verdict was 
rendered in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff for $3,000.00 (R-132, 133) At the time that 
the jury was polled by the defendants, one juror stated 
that he had not reached a decision as he had not been 
afforded ample time for deliberation. One other juror 
disagreed with the majority of six, and the remaining ' 
six were unanimous that $3,000.00 was the amount 
of damages suffered by the defendants from the taking 
of the only right-of-way to defendants' land by the 
State. Subsequently, a notice of appeal was filed by 
defendants. (R-138) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON THE GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE DAM-
AGES. 
The court entered an order on the 14th day of 
November, 1967, which stated: 
"The verdict of $16,251.00 is excessive and 
not justified for want of sufficient evidence and 
appears to be given under the influence of pas-
sion and prejudice." (R-125) 
The record amply substantiates that the damages to 
the property taken was between $58,400.00 down to 
$0.0. 
Mr. Jensen, one of the named defendants who 
qualified as an expert in real estate matters, in addition 
to being a property owner and therefore qualified to 
testify as to the value of his property, testified: 
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to what your 
land was fairly worth on May 18, 1964, with 
access? 
A. It would be $1,000.00 an acre, $73,000.00. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to what your 
land is worth without access as of May 18, 
1964? 
A. Maybe $200.00 an acre. It would have to be 
purchased by my neighbor. I only have one." 
(R-170) 
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Mr. Raymond C. Bowers, likewise one of the propert) 
owners, qualified as an expert also in real estate, testi-
fied: 
"Q. You based on your experience, and your 
observation over the years in the busines!; 
you have been in, do you have an opinio11 
as to the value of the acreage-total acre 
age, with access, as of May 18, 1964'! 
A. I think $1,000.00 an acre figure is a reason-
able figure." ( R-242) 
'Vhen Mr. llowers was asked what the property wa.1 , 
worth after the taking, he answered: 
"Q. Now, as of the same date, May 18, again 
1964, do you have an opinion as to the value 
of the land assuming you had no access to 
the land? 
A. Hasn't got much value. 
Q. Can you give this to us in dollar amount~ 
A. I haven't any opinion on it. I think it would 
be considerably less than $1,000.00 an acre 
with no access." ( R-243) 
An independent appraiser, Mr. Sterling 'V ebber, tes-
tified as to the value of the land: 
"Q. Mr. 'Vebber, I think I asked you to state 
the difference in dollars in the two. 
A. The difference would be approximately 
$25,300.00. 
Q. $25,300.00 between then-the difference idf 
the property was with access of 20 feet an 
without? 
A. That is correct." 
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.in(1ther witness, Mr. Scott Taggart, was called to tes-
:!ly, who likewise qualified as an expert and who mmeu 
foe adjoining property to the defendants, and vhc 1 
asked what the value of the property was replied: 
"THE WITNESS: The property that would 
be comparable as of that time, my guess is 
that it would have been worth in I;fay of 
1964 something in the vicinity of $.£00.00 to 
$500.00 an acre * * * . 
Q. Now this value you place in 1954, assumes 
there was access to the property, does it not~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now if there were no access to the property 
as of that date, would it be worth the same 
amount? 
MR PLATIS: Objection. No foundation has 
been laid. 
The Court overruled. 
l\IR. lVIcCARTHY: You may answer. 
A. It would not be worth the same amount. 
You could not get to it. 
Q. Would it be worth more or less? 
A. Less. 
Q. Do you have an op1mon as to how much 
worth, with no access? 
A. If you could get no access it would be Yir-
tually worthless." 
The court's order in granting plaintiff a new trial 
based upon sufficiency of evidence as to the amount 
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of damages is not substantiated by the record. It is 
submitted that the trial court erred and abused its 
discretion in granting the motion for new trial. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, et al, 8 
U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 730. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON THE GROUNDS OF PASSION AND 
PREJUDICE OF THE JURY. 
The Court granted its order granting to plaintiff 
a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict was 
given under "the influence of passion and prejudice". 
It is respectfully submitted that the court did not 
have grounds to order a new trial as there was no show· 
ing of any passion or prejudice whatsoever. The affi· 
davit of plaintiff's counsel (R-117, 118) does not set 
forth the alleged facts constituting passion and preju· 
dice. The plaintiff, through its counsel, does however in 
its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict 
(R-119 state that the verdict appears to be given under 
the influence of passion and prejudice in that the verdict 
is excessive, but does not set forth any grounds other 
than the excessiveness of verdict to predicate his state· 
ment that there was passion and prejudice on behalf 
of the jury. As stated above, the record amply supports 
a judgment of between $58,400.00 and $0.0. The 
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court's order of December 13, 1967, likewise does not 
set forth the basis upon which the court granted a new 
trial. As set forth in Saltas v. Affleck, 99 U. 381, 105 
P.2d 176: 
"In order to eliminate speculation as to the 
basis of the exercise of judicial discretion in 
granting new trials, the record should show the 
reasons and make it clear the court is not invad-
ing the province of the jury. The trial court 
should indicate wherein there was a plain dis-
regard by the jury of the instructions of the 
court or the evidence or what constituted bias 
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no rea-
sons need be given the province of the jury may 
be invaded at will. With no indication as to the 
basis for exercise of the power vested in the court 
to grant new trials the appeal tribunal would be 
left to analyze the matter from the evidence, the 
record, and the instructions. It would be re-
quired to search out possible reasons for agree-
ing or disagreeing with the trial court in the exer-
cise of a judicial discretion must be based upon 
some facts not withstanding great latitude is 
accorded the trial court in such matter." (Citing 
cases) 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Well-
man v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 336 P.2d 701, stated: 
"The appellate court should overrule the trial 
court's denial of a new trial involving a jury 
verdict only when upon a survey of all the evi-
dence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom and when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the amount of the 
award cannot be justified from the evidence on 
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any reasonable basis. Of course, if the trial court~ 
order granting a new trial is expressly made u11 
a misconception of the law, we should cormt 
such misconception by reversing such an or<ln 
granting a new trial." 
As shown above, the trial court expressly limited itsell 
to the grounds upon which it was granting a new triai. 
that is passion and prejudice of the jury and excessi1(· 
verdict. This is somewhat analogous to the situatio11 
which arose in the case of Bowden v. Denver & Rio 
Grande JV cstcrn Railroad Co., 3 U.2d 444, 280 P.2d 
240, ·wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that where 
the trial court limited its basis for granting a moti011 
for a new trial, the Supreme Court would only consider 
those bases upon which the trial court predicated ih 
motion. 
The court in this case stated: 
"VVe reaffirm our commitment that 'the right 
of jury trial* * * is * * * a right so fundamental 
and sacred to the citizen*** (that it) ~il10uld 
be jealously guarded by the courts.' " ( Citin~ 
Authority) 
"But once having been granted such right t1!1d 
a verdict rendered, it should not be regarded 
lightly nor overturned without good and sutfici-
f'nt reason; nor should a judgment be di~1turbe:I 
merelv because of an error. Onlv when there 11 
error ·both substantial and prejudicial. and whc; 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the resul! 
would have been different without it, should 
error be regarded as sufficient to upset :1 .i mhi· 
rnent or grant a new trial." 
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The plaintiff did not amplify its motion for new 
trial based upon excessive damages or upon passion 
and prejudice with any affidavit, as was the case in 
State v. Christensen, 13 U.2d 224, 371 P.2d 552, so 
that the appellate court now is faced with the problem 
of trying to surmise exactly just what passion and preju-
dice plaintiff was addressing to the court as the basis 
for a motion for new trial, and just what exactly the 
court based its surmise that there was passion and 
prejudice in granting such a motion. Salta.s v. Affleck, 
supra. This is a usurpation of the constitutional right 
to trial by jury and the right to have the jury fix the 
damages in condemnation cases, the usurpation occur-
ring when apparently the trial court felt that $16,251.00 
was excessive but that $12,001.00 was not excessive, as 
evidenced by the remittiture order of the trial court. 
'\Tith the wide variance between the damages as shown 
by the defendants and those shown by the plaintiff, 
it is hard for this writer to justify the court's position 
that $12,001.00 was justified but $16,251.00 was not 
justified, under the evidence as adduced at the trial. 
The Supreme Court of Utah passed upon a like 
situation in the case of Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District v. Willard A. Skeen, et al, supra, wherein 
the facts of the case showed that there had been testi-
mony that the value of the land ran from: plaintiff's 
experts at $45,000.00, to defendants' experts at $80,-
000.00. The jury returned a verdict of $66,850.00. The 
Supreme Court said: 
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"The jury had the benefit of opm10ns from 
three qualified experts as to the value of the 
land. Although these opinions vary considerablv, 
it is within a prerogative of the jury to belie;'e 
whom it chooses, and it chose to believe defend. 
ant's expert rather than plaintiff's. On cross ex· 
amination of two experts called by plaintiff, some 
doubt was cast as to the thoroughness of their 
inspection of the land, and this may well have 
affected the jury's consideration of their lower 
evaluations. 
When a jury verdict is supported by compe· · 
tent evidence, as was here the case, it is generally 
left unaltered by this court. In this case the 
alleged passion and prejudice which could alter 
this rule has not been demonstrated. Despite 
plaintiff's attempt to show the jury's hostile. 
attitude, it remains that the award was within• 
the estimate of value given by one of the expert 
witnesses, and being thus supported by compe· 
tent evidence is entitled to the recognition and 
affirmance of this court. The fact that the jury 
chose to render its verdict in harmony with the 
highest of available evaluations is not in itself 
cause for reversal." 
The defendants concede that the trial court has the 
prerogative and authority to grant a new trial, where 
there is excessive or inadequate damages, or condition· 
ally order a new trial if an additure or remittiture in 
not accepted by either party. Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 
U.2d 42, 327 P.2d 826; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122. 
247 P.2d 264. It is to be noted, however, that where 
there is adequate evidence to support the verdict ren, 
dered, the court may not substitute its judgment for 
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that of the jury and order a new trial conditioned upon 
acceptance of the additure or remittiture. As the court 
pointed out in the Bodon case: 
"\Ve affirm the responsibility of this court to 
be indulgent towards the verdict of the jury, 
and not to disturb it so long as it is within the 
bounds of reason in accordance with the prin-
ciples set forth in the companion case of Schnei-
der v. Suhrmann; and also that it is primarily 
the prerogative and the duty of the trial court 
to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and 
to order any necessary modification thereof. 
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the 
limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages 
as shown by the evidence, it should not be per-
mitted to stand, and if the trial court fails to 
rectify it we are obliged to make the correction 
on appeal." 
To the same effect see: Ruff v. Association for World 
Travel Exchange, I P.2d 249, 351 P.2d 623. The 
Supreme Court previously has pointed out that: 
"We have held that mere excessiveness of the 
verdict is not necessarily the standard for de-
termining prejudice, althought it might be." 
Stamp v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 5 U.2d 397, 303 
P.2d 279. This case goes on to say: 
"Not every verdict that appears to be exces-
sive will warrant a new trial or a reduction in 
the award, but the consideration which the court 
owes to a jury cannot be permitted to blind our 
eyes where the award can be accounted for only 
by the presence of passion or prejudice." 
15 
Such is not the instant case. As pointed out previoush 
the award of damages was completely within the testi. 
mony adduced by the experts for the plaintiff. 
In the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 U. 431, 18J 
P.2d 123, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
"But mere excessiveness of a verdict, without 
more, does not necessarily show that the verdict 
was arrived at by passion or prejudice. (Citing 
authority) It is true that the verdict might bt . 
grossly excessive and disproportionate to the · 
injury that we could say from that fact alont 
that as a matter of law the verdict must han 
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the 
facts must be such that the excess can be deter- ' 
mined as a matter of law, or the verdict must Lr , 
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscieme 
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or 
corruption of part of the jury." (Citing author· 
ity) (Emphasis the court's) 
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But 
the mere fact that it was more than another jury 
or more than this court, might have given, or 
even more than the evidence justified, does not 
conclusively show that it was a result of passion 
prejudice or corruption of part of the jury. 
To the same effect see: Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 118 U. 82, 218 P.2d 1080. 
It is elemental that the trial court has no discretion 
to grant a new trial absent a showing of one of the 
grounds specified in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Tangaro v. iJ'larrero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d 
16 
390. In the instant case there is no showing whatsoever 
ot any passion or prejudice or excessiveness of the jury's 
verdict, and therefore the court abused its discretion in 
granting a new trial and for that matter in ordering 
a remittiture. 
The Supreme Court of Utah pointed out in Paul 
v. Kirkendall, 1 U.2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, that: 
"It is not enough, under this rule (Rule 59 
(a) ( 5) ) nor under the code provision which 
is supplanted, merely to allege that the amount 
itself is excessive. The amount of the verdict is 
ordinarily a matter exclusively for the jury and 
on the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone, 
the court may not interfere with the jury's verdict 
unless it clearly appears that the award was 
rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice. 
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict 
presents a situation that such inadequacy or 
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of 
the evidence or the instructions of the court as to 
the law applicable to the case as to satisfy the 
court that the verdict was rendered under such 
disregard or misapprehension of the evidence 
or influence of passion or prejudice, then the 
court may exercise its discretion in the interests 
of justice and grant a new trial. (citing author-
ity) Therefore in reviewing the trial court's 
ruling denying defendant's motion for a new 
trial on the grounds of excessiveness of damages 
awarded by the jury's verdict, this court is limit-
ed to a determination of whether such a ruling 
was an abuse of discretion." 
Plaintiff would now say that because its appraisers 
appraised the property at $0.0 damage to defendants, 
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that this testimony should be taken to the exclusion , 
of defendants' experts. As pointed out in the case ol 
State Road Commission v. 1laggart, 19 U.2d 247, 430 
P.2d 167, it is up to the determination by the jury of 
the relative superiority of qualifications of the witnesses, 
including the expert witnesses. In the Taggart case, 
the severance damage was placed at nothing by one 
state appraiser, $44,000.00 by another appraiser, as i 
opposed to the defendants' experts who placed the 
damages at between $178,000.00 and $315,000.00. The : 
court pointed out that the finding of the jury in respect 
to severance or consequential damages was within the 
range of the testimony and that therefore there was • 
a reasonable basis upon which the jury could find the 1 
damages that they did find, and that therefore there ' 
was no abuse of discretion in not granting a new trial. 
This is the same situation as is now before the court in 
the present case, except that the exact opposite result 
was found by the jury, that is, the jury chose to believe 
the defendants' experts over the plaintiff's as was the 
reversal in the Taggart case. 
For the trial court now to substitute its judgment 
for that of the jury is to usurp the jury's prerogatiw. 
In the old venerable case, Jensen v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Railroad Co., 44 U. 100, 138 P. 1184, 1192, 
Justice Straup pointed out that: 
"A court, vacating a verdict, and granting 
a new trial by merely setting up his opinion or 
judgment against that of the jury, but usurps 
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judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional 
trial by jury." 
The court then pointed out that there are occasions 
where the trial court may grant a new trial where there 
has been "excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice", 
however, the court points out: 
"But before the court is justified to do that, 
it should be clearly made to appear that the jury 
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law 
by which the damages were to be regulated or 
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evi-
dence, and by so doing committed gross and 
paltable error by rendering a verdict so enor-
mous or outrageous or unjust as to be attribut-
able to neither the charge nor the evidence, but 
only to passion or prejudice." 
This case, while decided in 1914, has weathered the 
years and is still the law of Utah today, the concurring 
opinion of Justice Crockett in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U .2d 
435, 1326 P.2d 722, notwithstanding. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS PRE-
SERVED THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM 
THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Under Rule 72 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court only 
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from a final judgment. The authorities are long and' 
unwavering that an order for a new trial is not 1111 
appealable order. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 U.21! 
295, 409 P.2d 972. In the instant case, as a matter of 
preserving their right to appeal and also of seeking an 
intermediate appeal, the appellants followed the pro· 
cedures as outlined in Flaslmn v. Paulsen, 15 U.2d 185, 
389 P.2d 737, and .T. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 
17 U.2d 120, 405 P.2d 343, and filed a petition for inter-
mediate appeal with the Supreme Court and likewise 1 
preserved the claimed error in granting a motion for 
new trial. 
The petition for interlocutory appeal was denied i 
on January 17, 1968, by the Supreme Court of Utah! 
See File No. 11123, Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. 
The defendants-appellants are now entitled to raise 
before the Supreme Court the issue as to whether or 
not the trial court abused its discretion in granting a 
new trial to the plaintiff in this matter. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY, IN THE SECOND TRIAL, Bl·. 
PROPERLY DELIBERATED AND THERE-. 
FORE APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO 
A NEW TRIAL. 
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jur: 
returned from its deliberations and returned a yerdicl 
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of $3,000.00 in favor of respondent and against appel-
lants. Upon request of the respondent's counsel, the 
jury was polled and two jurors indicated that this was 
not their verdict. One juror, a Mr. Gates, stating: "I 
hadn't reached a decision yet". The other juror, a Mr. 
Stander, replied that it was not his verdict. 
Appellants recognize that under Article 1, Section 
10, of the Constitution of Utah, in civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict, however, it is 
submitted that the jurors must deliberate to reach that 
verdict. The instructions to the jury clearly pointed 
this out in instructoin 23, which was the standard jury 
instruction Section 1.7, Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 
and jury instruction 24, which was the standard jury 
instruction Section 1.8. It is required that the jurors 
consult with one another and deliberate with the view 
of reaching an agreement. It is submitted that where 
the jurors do not take enough time for all of the jurors 
to reach a decision, be it against or for a verdict, there 
has been improper deliberations as in effect what the 
jurors are doing is each individual juror decides the 
matter himself. In the case of Glover v. Berger, (Wyo., 
1953) 263 P.2d 498, the Wyoming court affirmed the 
trial court's rejection of an instruction which stated 
that the individual jurors should decide the matter 
themselves. The court said: 
"It intimated in effect that each juryman 
should disregard the views of his fellows, no 
matter how reasonable or cojunt these were. 
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Seldom would a jury return a unanimous ver. 
diet of the views if a single juryman were to 
control the verdict as the instruction No. 24 
aforesaid intimated should be done." 
It is submitted that so long as one of the jurymen has 
not reached a decision one way or the other, the jury 
still has not deliberated as is required by the jury in· 
structions and the law of the State of Utah. Therefore 
the trial court erred in entering a judgment on the 
verdict of the jury, and should have entered an order 
for new trial for appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of 
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER 
&BEASLEY 
and 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
430 ·Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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